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Abstract
In this paper we derive characterizations of egalitarian solutions on two subclasses of the class
of balanced games. Firstly we show that the Dutta–Ray solution is the only solution that satisfies
symmetry, independence of irrelevant core allocations, and continuity on the class of convex
games. Secondly, together with the other two requirements, a strengthening of continuity to
monotonicity in the value of the grand coalition turns out to be sufficient for the characterization
of the lexicographically maximal solution on the class of large core games.
  2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1 . Introduction
The notion of egalitarianism was first introduced in the context of TU-games by Dutta
and Ray (1989). They showed that their interpretation of egalitarianism yields at most
one egalitarian allocation for a given TU-game and that there is exactly one egalitarian
allocation in case the game is convex. They also devised an algorithm to compute the
egalitarian allocation for such convex games.
In the years after they published their paper two main branches started to develop in
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this research area. On one hand people were searching for egalitarian solutions that
existed for larger classes of games then just convex games. Examples are Dutta and Ray
(1991) who introduced a notion of constrained egalitarian allocation that existed for
weakly superadditive games and Arin and Inarra (1997) who introduced several forms of
egalitarian solutions based on the notion of the core and showed that these solutions
exist for balanced games.
On the other hand there is the axiomatic approach. During the last few years several
characterizations of the above-mentioned egalitarian solutions have been found, most of
them by means of some form of consistency. For example Dutta (1990) showed that the
egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) is the only solution that is consistent both
in the sense of Maschler and Davis and of Hart and Mas-Colell among all solutions that
coincide with the egalitarian solution on two person games. Klijn et al. (1998) provide
two characterizations of the Dutta–Ray solution using (weak versions of) these types of
consistency separately. Both papers deal with the class of convex games. In Arin et al.
(2000) the notion of independence of irrelevant core allocations is used to characterize
egalitarian solutions as they are defined in Arin and Inarra (1997). Those results are
stated on the domain of balanced games.
This paper consists in fact of two different parts. In the first part we consider the class
of convex games. In Arin et al. (2000) it is already shown that any continuous core
solution defined on the class of balanced games that satisfies symmetry and in-
dependence of irrelevant core allocations is (weakly) egalitarian. Specifically such a
solution must coincide with the Dutta–Ray solution on the class of convex games. In
this paper we will show that these axioms (continuity, symmetry and independence of
irrelevant core allocations) characterize the Dutta–Ray solution on the class of convex
games. This result is somewhat stronger than the result in Arin et al. (2000) in the sense
that the restriction of the domain to convex games weakens the power of the IIC
requirement.
The second part concerns large core games. These games were first introduced by
Sharkey (1982). A game is said to have a large core if any (non-efficient) allocation that
satisfies the core inequalities (i.e. it is an element of the upper core) dominates a core
element of the game. These games arise naturally from economic situations involving
cost allocation. We show that on this class of games an extension of the Dutta–Ray
solution called the lexmax (lexicographically maximal) solution is axiomatized by
symmetry, independence of irrelevant core allocations and monotony of the solution
w.r.t. the value of the grand coalition. Moreover we show that a generalization of the
algorithm designed by Dutta and Ray can be used to compute the lexmax solution on the
class of large core games.
2 . Preliminaries
NA transferable utility game (or TU-game) v is a function v: 2 →R on the collection
N2 of subsets of a finite set N (the players of the game) such that v(5)5 0. Any subset S
of the player set N is called a coalition and v(S) is called the worth of coalition S.
NA vector x[R is called an allocation to the players. The ith coordinate x of thei
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allocation x represents the payoff to player i[N. Thus, the amount of money coalition S
gets according to this allocation is equal to x(S)[o x . The allocation x is calledi[S i
efficient if x(N) equals the worth v(N) of the grand coalition N. The core C(v) of the
Ngame v is the set of efficient allocations x in R with
x(S)$ v(S) for all S,N.
A game v with a non-empty core is called balanced. Furthermore, a game v is called
convex if
v(S)1 v(T )# v(S< T )1 v(S> T )
for all coalitions S and T in N. It is well-known that convex games are balanced.
Let # be a subset of the class of balanced games. A solution on # is a function that
assigns to each game in # one single allocation of that game. It is called a core solution
if for each game the allocation assigned to this game is a core element of the game.
2 .1. Egalitarian solutions
n
ˆLet x be an allocation in R . By x we denote the vector that results from x by
ˆ ˆ ˆpermuting the coordinates of x in such a way that x $ x $ ? ? ? $ x . We say that the1 2 n
vector x Lorenz dominates the vector y if
k k
ˆ ˆO x #O y for all k[ h1, . . . , nji i
i51 i51
and if at least one of these inequalities is strict. In words: for every k the group of k
richest people with respect to x must at most be as rich as the group of k richest people
with respect to y (and there must be one strict inequality). A core allocation x is called
egalitarian if no other core allocation Lorenz dominates x.
Observe that if for a game v the equal share payoff of v(N) / uNu to the players
constitutes a core allocation it is necessarily the only egalitarian allocation in this game.
A solution on a class # of balanced games is called egalitarian if it assigns to each
game in the class an egalitarian allocation of that game.
We will now briefly discuss the egalitarian solutions we will encounter in this paper.
First, we will discuss the lexicographically maximal and minimal solutions.
NWe say that an allocation x in R is lexicographically preferred to another allocation y
N
ˆ ˆin R if the first non-zero coordinate of the vector y2 x is positive. This is denoted by
ˆ ˆxs y. By xK y we mean x5 y or xs y.lex lex lex
Now, for a balanced game v, we define the set Lmax(v) of lexicographically most
preferred core allocations as the set of allocations x in C(v) with xK y for all y inlex
C(v). Analogously we define Lmin(v) as the set of allocations x in C(v) with 2 xK 2lex
y for all y in C(v).
From Lemma 1.1 of Moulin (1988) it follows directly that both Lmax(v) and Lmin(v)
are single-valued. Hence we get the following well-known result.
Theorem 1. Lmax and Lmin are core solutions on the class of balanced games.
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It is straightforward to check that Lmax and Lmin are even egalitarian. In Section 3
we will focus our attention on the Lmax solution on the class of large core games.
For convex games the situation is fairly simple. It was shown by Arin and Inarra
(1997) that a convex game admits precisely one egalitarian allocation. This allows us to
speak of the egalitarian solution on the class of convex games. Moreover they showed
that, for convex games, the solution introduced by Dutta and Ray (1989) coincides with
this solution. For that reason we will refer to the unique egalitarian solution on the class
of convex games as the Dutta–Ray solution.
2 .2. Properties
In the axiomatizations of the egalitarian solutions presented above we will basically
use symmetry and continuity of the solution together with a form of the axiom of
independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Let us first pay some attention to the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom.
This property is widely used in the context of bargaining situations. In bargaining
models it is the objective of agents to reach a ‘best’ agreement point given a non-empty
set of possible agreement points. Informally, in bargaining situations the IIA axiom says
the following. Suppose we have two bargaining situations, such that the set of possible
agreement points of one problem is contained in the set of possible agreement points of
the other problem. Furthermore, suppose that the solution of the larger problem is
available in the smaller problem. Then the solution of the larger problem should also be
the solution of the smaller problem. The interpretation is that the solution was already
the ‘best’ point of the larger set. Hence, if no new alternatives are offered, and only
irrelevant alternatives are canceled, then the solution should remain the same.
The use of IIA in the context of TU-games is less obvious than in the context of
bargaining situations because changing a TU-game means changing the worth of some
coalitions, and players may have the feeling that their ‘strength’ has either increased or
decreased. Most solution concepts on TU-games reflect this notion of strength, and do
therefore not satisfy such a condition. The nucleolus and the Shapley value for example
do not.
However, egalitarian considerations originate from the idea that players have to
negotiate about which allocation to choose before they know which role in society they
will occupy, i.e. before they know which player they will be. This type of negotiation is
usually referred to as negotiation behind the veil of ignorance. Under this assumption it
is not so strange that, once the players have decided which allocation is ‘best for
society’, they will stick to this decision when the number of possibilities is decreased.
Possible allocations in this setting are identified with core allocations. Thus the core
restrictions function as minimum requirements for an allocation to be acceptable to
society. These ideas are formalized in
(i) (IIC). A core solution f on a class # of balanced games is independent of
irrelevant core allocations if f(v)5f(w) for any two games v and w in # with
f(v)[C(w),C(v).
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The other two axioms are fairly straightforward and widely accepted, so we will
simply state them without further discussion.
(ii) Symmetry (SYM). A solution f on # is said to be symmetric if for any game v in
# it holds that f (v)5f (v) whenever v(S< hij)5 v(S< h jj) for all S,N\hi, jj.i j
niii) Continuity (CON). A solution f on # is continuous if lim f(v )5f(v)n→`
n n
whenever lim v 5 v (provided of course that all games v and v are in #.)n→`
3 . The egalitarian solution for convex games
One of the immediate consequences of Theorem 4 in Arin et al. (2000) is that any
core solution on the class of balanced games that satisfies IIC, SYM and CON coincides
with the Dutta–Ray solution on the class of convex games. In this section we will even
show that any solution defined only on the class of convex games must be equal to the
solution of Dutta and Ray as soon as it satisfies IIC, SYM and CON. Note that this is
indeed a stronger result, since the restriction of the IIC property to the class of convex
games yields a weaker requirement in comparison to this property taken on the class of
all balanced games.
First we need to introduce some terminology. A chain is a collection 6 of coalitions
such that for any two elements S and T of this collection at least one of the two
inclusions S, T and T , S holds, and moreover 5 and N are elements of 6. (These last
two conditions are usually not a part of the definition of a chain, but in this paper it is
convenient to do so.) Usually we will index the elements of 6 in such a way that
55 S , S , ? ? ? , S 5N.1 2 k
Now let v be a convex game and let 6 be a chain. Then the partial marginal p(v,
N6 )[R is defined by
v(S )2 v(S )m11 m
]]]]]p(v, 6 )[i uS \S um11 m
where m is the unique index such that i is an element of S \S .m11 m
Remark. In general a partial marginal need not be an element of the core of v. However,
since v is convex, marginal vectors are examples of partial marginals that happen to be
elements of the core of v.
Now let f be a core solution, defined on the class of convex games, that satisfies IIC,
SYM and CON. A crucial step in the proof of the main result of this section, that f must
be equal to the Dutta–Ray solution, is the observation stated below that f(v) is a partial
marginal of v. It is however an arduous task to prove it. Therefore we have put the
results involved in this proof in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Let v be a convex game. Then f(v) is a partial marginal of v.
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So, we want to show now that f(v) equals the Dutta–Ray solution. First we will show
this for games whose value of grand coalition is sufficiently large in comparison with the
worths of the other coalitions.
Lemma 3. Let w be a convex game such that uSuw(N)$ uNuw(S) for all coalitions S.
Then f(w) is equal to the Dutta–Ray allocation.
Proof. First notice that, since uSuw(N)$ uNuw(S) for all coalitions S, the equal share
allocation that gives w(N) / uNu to each player i in N is a core allocation of w. Thus this is
the only egalitarian allocation of the game w and therefore necessarily equal to the
Dutta–Ray allocation. So, it suffices to show that f(w) is equal to the equal share
allocation.
In order to do that, choose
w(S)
]]K[min 5± S,NUH JuSu
and define the game u by
KuSu if S±N
u(S)[H
w(N) if S5N.
It is straightforward to check that this game is convex. Now, since all players in u are
symmetric, we know by SYM that
u(N) w(N)
]] ]]f(u) 5 5i uNu uNu
for all players i[N. Second, since for all non-empty S±N
w(S)
]]u(S)5KuSu# uSu5w(S)
uSu
and u(N)5w(N), we know that C(w) is a subset of C(u). Third, we already saw that the
equal share allocation f(u) is an element of the core of w. Hence, by IIC, f(w) must be
equal to the equal share allocation f(u). h
In order to complete the proof of the main result of this section we need some insight
in the behavior of core solutions that exclusively assign partial marginals. We use the
following lemma, showing that, whenever two partial marginals in the core happen to
coincide for a certain game, they either remain coincidental or at most one of them stays
in the core when the value of the grand coalition is decreased.
Lemma 4. Let w be a convex game. Suppose that there are two chains 6 5 hS , . . . , S j1 k
and 7 5 hT , . . . , T j such that p(w, 6 )5 p(w, 7 ). Further suppose that u is a convex1 r
game with u(S)5w(S) for all coalitions S±N and u(N),w(N). Then either S 5k21
T and then automatically p(u, 6 )5 p(u, 7 ), or S ±T and then at least one ofr21 k21 r21
the two allocations p(u, 6 ) and p(u, 7 ) is not an element of the core of u.
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Proof. From the definition of a partial marginal it is easy to deduce that p(u, 6 )5 p(u,
7 ) if S 5T .k21 r21
So assume that S is not equal to T . By symmetry we can assume w.l.o.g. thatk21 r21
there is a player j in S \T . Now, since p(w, 6 ) is equal to p(w, 7 ), we know thatk21 r21
O p(w, 7 ) 5 O p(w, 6 ) 5w(S ).i i k21
i[S i[Sk21 k21
However, player j is a member of the coalition N\T . So, player j gets strictly less inr21
p(u, 7 ) than in p(w, 7 ), while none of the players gets more in the first allocation than
in the second one. Hence,
O p(u, 7 ) , O p(w, 7 ) 5w(S )5 v(S )5 u(S )i i k21 k21 k21
i[S i[Sk21 k21
and p(u,7 ) violates at least one core condition for the game u. h
Now consider the following setting. Let v be a convex game. Let U(v) denote the
collection of games w for which w(S)5 v(S) for all coalitions S not equal to N and
w(N)$ v(N). Since v is convex it can easily be seen that all games in U(v) are also
convex.
Notice that U(v) can be parameterized by the set of real numbers l$ v(N) in the
following way. For each l$ v(N) the game v(l) in U(v) is defined by
v(S) if S±N
v(l)(S)5H
l if S5N.
In other words, the set U(v) is a halfline in the cone of convex games parameterized by
the value of the grand coalition.
NNow consider two continuous functions c and c from U(v) to R for which c (w)1 2 1
and c (w) are both partial marginals in the core of w for all games w in U(v). We get the2
following result.
Lemma 5. Suppose that c (w) equals c (w) for some w in U(v). Then c (v) equals1 2 1
c (v).2
Proof. We will prove the above statement by contradiction. So, suppose that c (v) is not1
equal to c (v). Consider the set2
L[hl$ v(N)uc (v(l))5c (v(l))j.1 2
Since c (w) equals c (w) for some w in U(v) we know that L is not empty. So, since it1 2
is bounded from below, z[inf(L) exists. Moreover, since c (v) does not equal c (v)1 2
and c and c are continuous, z . v(N). Thus, we can take an increasing sequence1 2
l , l , . . .1 2
with l $ v(N) that converges to z. Furthermore, since the collection of chains is finitek
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we can, by switching to a subsequence if necessary, make sure that there are two chains
6 and 7 such that
c (v(l ))5 p(v(l ), 6 ) and c (v(l ))5 p(v(l ), 7 )1 k k 2 k k
for all k[N. Thus, from the definition of z and the continuity of c , c and the partial1 2
marginals we get that
p(v(z ), 6 )5c (v(z ))5c (v(z ))5 p(v(z ), 7 ).1 2
Hence,
p(v(z ), 6 )5 p(v(z ), 7 )
and
p(v(l ), 6 )± p(v(l ), 7 )k k
for all k. This however, contradicts Lemma 4 since by assumption all the above
allocations must be core elements of the games in question. h
Now we can prove
Theorem 6. The Dutta–Ray solution is the only core solution on the class of convex
games that satisfies IIC, SYM and CON.
Proof. From the results of Arin et al. (2000) it is clear that the Dutta–Ray solution of a
convex game v is the unique core allocation allocation x in v for which
ixi # iyi2 2
holds for all core allocations y of the game v. (As usual, i ? i denotes the Euclidean2
norm.) From this observation it immediately follows that the Dutta–Ray solution
satisfies IIC and SYM. The continuity follows with a little bit more work from the same
observation and the maximum theorem of Berge (1966).
So, we only have to show the converse statement. To this end, let f be a core solution
that satisfies IIC, SYM and CON. In order to show that f is equal to the Dutta–Ray
solution, let v be a convex game. We will show that f(v) is equal to the Dutta–Ray
solution of v.
First we will show that there is a game v(l*) in U(v) for which f(v(l*)) is equal to
the Dutta–Ray solution of v(l*). To this end, take
uNuv(S)
]]l*[max 5± S,N .UH JuSu
Then obviously v(l*) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3. So, f(v(l*)) equals the
Dutta–Ray solution of the game v(l*). Hence, since both f and the Dutta–Ray solution
are continuous (f by assumption, and Dutta–Ray simply because it is continuous), and
both solutions are core solutions that exclusively assign partial marginals (by Theorem 2
for both solutions), f(v) equals the Dutta–Ray solution by Lemma 5. h
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4 . Egalitarianism for large core games
In this section we will give a characterization of the Lmax solution on the class of
large core games. The three axioms used are IIC, SYM and AMON, a condition that (in
combination with the other two) is somewhat stronger than CON. We will also provide a
simple procedure for the calculation of Lmax. A similar procedure is already described
in Arin and Inarra (1997) for the calculation of Lmin on the class of veto-rich games.
˜Just like the procedure of Arin and Inarra, our procedure reduces to the algorithm of
Dutta and Ray (1989) when applied to the class of convex games.
Let v be a balanced game. As in the previous section we define U(v) as the set of
games w with w(S)5 v(S) for all S±N and w(N)$ v(N).
The game v is said to have a large core if for all w[U(v) and for all x[C(w) there
exists an allocation y in C(v) such that y# x.
The procedure. We will now present a procedure that has a (large core) game v as input
and produces a vector f(v) as output.
Step 1. Let h 5h (v)[R be the minimal number h for which1 1
uSuh$ v(S) for all S,N.
Let P (v) be the coalition of players i[N for which1
uSuh 5 v(S) for some S,N with i[ S.1
Define f(v)[h for all i[P (v).i 1 1
Step k. Suppose that P (v) is already defined and that f(v) is already defined for allk21 j
players j in P (v). Let h 5h (v)[R be the minimal number h for whichk21 k k
O f(v) 1 uS\P (v)uh$ v(S) for all S,N.j k21
j[P (v)>Sk21
Let P (v) be the coalition of players i[N for whichk
O f(v) 1 uS\P (v)uh 5 v(S) for some S,N with i[ S.j k21 k
j[P (v)>Sk21
Define f(v)[h for all i[P (v)\P (v).i k k k21
Remarks. First notice that the coalition P (v) strictly includes P (v) as long as P (v)k k21 k21
is not the grand coalition N. Therefore it is clear that P (v)5N. So, f(v) is defined foruN u
all players in at most uNu steps, and the procedure can then be terminated.
One can think of this procedure as follows. In the first step we check for which games
v(h) in U(v) with v(h)(N)5huNu the equal share solution (h, . . . , h) is an element of the
core of the game v(h). Once we have established the minimal value h for which this is1
the case, we define P (v) as the set of players that are a member of some coalition S that1
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1is tight on the allocation (h , . . . , h ) in the game v(h ). We now allocate h to these1 1 1 1
players.
In the second step we check for which games v(h) the allocation where the players in
P (v) get h and the players outside P (v) get h is still an element of the core of v(h).1 1 1
The minimal value h for which this is the case is called h . Etcetera.2
We will first try to show that the resulting vector f(v) is in fact equal to the Lmax(v).
To this end we need
Lemma 7. The vector f(v) is an element of C(v).
Proof. It is clear that
f(v)(S)$ v(S) for all S#N
by construction. So we only need to show that f(v)(N)# v(N).
Define the game w by
v(S) if S±N
w(S)[Hf(v)(N) if S5N
Then w is clearly an element of U(v). It is also obvious that f(v) is an element of C(w).
Moreover, since v has a large core, there must be an allocation y in the core of v with
y#f(v). Let j be an arbitrary player in N. We trivially have y #f(v) . We will alsoj j
show that y $f(v) . By the construction of f(v), there must be a coalition T with j[ Tj j
and f(v)(T )5 v(T ). Since y[C(v), we must also have y(T )5 v(T ). Now, using that
y(T \j)#f(v)(T \j), we get that
y 5 y(T )2 y(T \j)5 v(T )2 y(T \j)$ v(T )2f(v)(T \j)5f(v) .j j
This shows that y 5f(v) for an arbitrary j[N, hence y5f(v) is an element of thej j
core of v. h
So now we know that f is indeed a core solution on the class of large core games.
The next Theorem identifies this solution with the Lmax solution.
Theorem 8. The core solution f equals Lmax.
Proof. Let v be a large core game. We will show the equality of f(v) and Lmax(v) by
induction to the number of steps in the calculation of f(v).
A. Consider P (v). Take a player j[P (v) and a coalition S with j[ S and1 1
f(v)(S)5 v(S).
Note that
1A coalition S is said to be tight on an allocation x in a game v if x(S)5 v(S).
J. Arin et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 46 (2003) 327–345 337
2 2
Lmax(v) #Lmax(v) #f(v) 5f(v) .j 1 1 j
This inequality holds for all i[ S, and not one of these inequalities can be strict, since
this would imply
Lmax(v)(S),f(v)(S)5 v(S),
contradicting the fact that Lmax is a core solution. Hence, f(v) 5Lmax(v) for alli i
players i[P (v).1
B. Suppose we already know that
f(v) 5Lmax(v)i i
for all players i[P (v). Take a player j[P (v)\P (v) and a coalition S with j[ S andk k11 k
f(v)(S)5 v(S).
By the construction of f(v) we have f(v) ,f(v) for all i[P (v). Hence, by thej i k
induction hypothesis, f(v) ,f(v) 5Lmax(v) for all i[P (v). Then we must alsoj i i k
have Lmax(v) ,Lmax(v) for all i[P (v). Otherwise we would get that f(v)j i k
s Lmax(v), which would be in contradiction with the fact shown in Lemma 7 thatlex
f(v) is a core element and the definition of Lmax(v). Hence, denoting t5 uP (v)u1 1, itk
follows that
2 2
Lmax(v) #Lmax(v) #f(v) 5f(v) .j t t j
This inequality holds for all i[ S, and not one of these inequalities can be strict, since
this would imply
Lmax(v)(S),f(v)(S)5 v(S),
contradicting the fact that Lmax is a core solution. Hence, f(v) 5Lmax(v) for alli i
players i[P (v) h.k11
Using this result we will proceed with a characterization of the solution Lmax on the
class of large core games. We already know that Lmax satisfies IIC, SYM and CON,
even on the class of balanced games. These three axioms are not enough though to
characterize Lmax on the class of large core games.
Example 5. Consider the four player game v defined by
7 if S5 h1, 2j
7 if S5 h1, 3j
12 if S5 h1, 2, 3, 4j
v(S)[ 0 if S5 h1j, h2j or h3j
2 3 if S5 h4j2 4 else.
First we will show that this game has a large core. To this end, let x be an allocation
with x(S)$ v(S) for all S,N. We have to show that there exists an allocation y in C(v)
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with y# x. Suppose that this is not the case. Then we may assume w.l.o.g. that
x(N). 12 and no coordinate of x can be decreased without violation of one of the
inequalities x(S)$ v(S) for some S±N. Then x 5 2 3.4
(a) If x 5 v(2)5 0. Then x 1 x # v(13)5 7 so x(N)# 01 72 3, 12 which con-2 1 3
tradicts x(N). 12. Similarly, x 5 v(3) cannot be the case.3
(b) From (a) it follows now that x 1 x 5 7 and x 1 x 5 7. Now we get x(N)# 711 2 1 3
72 3, 12. Contradiction.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
] ] ] ] ] ] ] ]However, Lmax(v)5 (3 , 3 , 3 , 1 ) and Lmin(v)5 (4 , 2 , 2 , 2 ) while both2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Lmax and Lmin satisfy IIC, SYM and CON on the class of (balanced and therefore also)
large core games. Hence, there are at least two different solutions on the class of large
core games that satisfy all three axioms.
In order to get a characterization, CON is somewhat strengthened. Let c be a solution
on the class of large core games. The solution c is said to satisfy AMON (aggregate
monotonicity, see e.g. Young (1985)) if for every pair of large core games v and w with
w[U(v) we have c(v)#c(w).
It is not difficult to see that no egalitarian solution on the class of balanced games
satisfies this condition. Restricted to the class of large core games, Lmax is an aggregate
monotonic solution though. And since we already know that f is equal to Lmax it is
even quite straightforward to show
Theorem 9. The solution Lmax satisfies IIC, SYM and AMON on the class of large core
games.
Proof. Firstly, since Lmax(v) is defined as the maximal point in C(v) according to the
Npreference relation s on R it is clear that Lmax satisfies IIC. Secondly, since Lmaxlex
equals f it is clear from the procedure that Lmax satisfies AMON. Finally, if two
players i and j are symmetric in a game v it is obvious that i is a member of P (v) if andk
only if j is a member of this coalition. Therefore they get the same amount in
f(v)5Lmax(v) h.
Finally we will show in this section that Lmax is the only solution on the class of
large core games that satisfies these three axioms. To see this, let c be a core solution on
the class of large core games that satisfies SYM, IIC and AMON.
In the proof the following construction is used. Let v be a (large core) game and let
T ±N be a coalition. For each player k[ T, define
m(k)[maxhv(S)2 v(S\k)uk[ S, T j.
Now choose a number K. 0 such that 2KuSu, v(S) for all coalitions S and
O m(k)2KuN\T u, v(N).
k[T
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Notice that this is viable since N\T is not the empty coalition by assumption. Define the
Tgame v by
v(S) if S, T or S5NTv (S)[H2KuSu else.
T TSince the core of v is a subset of the core of v it is clear that v is balanced. Lemma 14
shows that it is even a large core game. Now we can show
Theorem 10. The core solution c is equal to the solution f.
Proof. Let w be a large core game. We will show the equality of f(v) and c(v) by
induction to the number of steps required to calculate f(v).
TA. Suppose that P (v)5N. Take T[5 and construct the large core game v . Then1
Tfrom the definition of v it is clear that all players are symmetric. So by SYM we know
that
T Tv (N) v (N) v(N) v(N)T ]] ]] ]] ]]c(v )5 , . . . , 5 , . . . , .S D S DuNu uNu uNu uNu
On the other hand, since P (v)5N, we know that f(v) is also equal to the equal share1
T Tpoint, so f(v)5c(v ). Moreover, c(v )5f(v) must be an element of C(v) by Lemma
T T7. Hence, since C(v),C(v ), we get that c(v)5c(v )5f(v) by IIC.
B. Suppose we already know that c(w)5f(w) for all large core games w with
P (w)5N. Take a large core game v with P (v)±N and P (v)5N. We will show thatk k k11
c(v)5f(v). To this end, note that the coalition T[P (v) is not equal to the grandk
T
coalition by assumption, so we can construct the large core game v . Then we can also
T 2define the large core game w[U(v ) by
Tv (S) if S±N
w(S)[H
f(v)(T )1 uN\T uh (v) if S5N.k
T TSince w(S)5 v (S)5 v(S) if S,T5P (v) and w(S)5 v (S), v(S) for all otherk
coalitions S unequal to N, we clearly have
f(v) if i[P (v)i k
f(w) 5Hi h (v) if i[⁄ P (v)k k
by the particular choice of w(N). It is also clear that P (w)5N, so c(w)5f(w) by thek
induction hypothesis.
TNext we will show that c(v )5f(v), i.e.
f(v) if i[P (v)i kTc(v ) 5Hi h (v) if i[⁄ P (v).k11 k
2 T TThe inequality w(N)$ v (N) follows from the definitions of v (N) and h (v).k
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To this end, let j be a player in P (v). Then there is a coalition S with j[ S andk
S,P (v) such that v(S)5f(v)(S). Then we also havek
Tc(w)(S)5f(v)(S)5 v(S)5 v (S).
TFurther, by AMON, we know that c(v )#c(w). So, since c is a core solution, it
Tfollows that c(v ) 5c(w) for all i[ S, otherwise we would havei i
T Tc(v )(S),c(w)(S)5 v (S).
THence, in particular, c(v ) 5c(w) .j j
TOn the other hand, the players outside P (v) get the same in c(v ) by SYM. So, theyk
have to divide the amount
T Tv (N)2c(v )(T )5 v(N)2c(w)(T )5 v(N)2f(v)(T )
equally among each other. However, since T5P (v) and P (v)5N this amount mustk k11
Tbe equal to h (v). Hence, c(v )5f(v).k11
T TSo, now we have c(v )5f(v)[C(v). Hence, since C(v),C(v ), we get that
T Tc(v)5c(v ) by IIC and c(v)5c(v )5f(v). h
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A ppendix A. Proofs for Section 2
The aim of this appendix is to provide a proof of Theorem 2 as well as the
background results used in that proof. First we give some general statements concerning
convex games. Then we will give the proofs that concern the specific setup in Section 2.
It is a well-known fact that the space of convex games is a polyhedral cone, since it is
defined by the inequalities
v(S)1 v(T )# v(S> T )1 v(S< T ).
It is not so hard to show that this cone is of full dimension. Then a basic result in linear
algebra states that a game v is an element of the interior of this cone if and only if for
every convex game w there is a number ´ . 0 such that (11´)v2´w is still convex.
We will use this fact freely throughout this section. Further notice that
v(S)1 v(T )5 v(S> T )1 v(S< T )
whenever S is a subset of T or T is a subset of S. So, the interior of the cone of convex
games is given by those strict inequalities
v(S)1 v(T ), v(S> T )1 v(S< T )
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for which S is not a subset of T and T is not a subset of S. A game that satisfies these
strict inequalities is called strictly convex. Hence, a game v is an element of the interior
of the cone of convex games if and only if it is strictly convex.
Lemma 11. Let v be a strictly convex game. Let further x be an element of the core of v.
Then the collection of coalitions that are tight on x is a chain.
Proof. Suppose that S and T are two coalitions such that x(S)5 v(S) and x(T )5 v(T ).
Suppose further that S is not a subset of T and T is not a subset of S. Then, since v is an
element of the interior of the cone of convex games and x is a core allocation, we would
get
x(S>T )1 x(S< T ) 5 x(S)1 x(T )
5 v(S)1 v(T )
, v(S> T )1 v(S< T )
# x(S> T )1 x(S< T )
Contradiction. Finally note that the coalitions 5 and N are tight on x by definition. h
Given a convex game v and given a chain 6, it is our aim to construct a convex game
v* such that
v*# v,
v*(S)5 v(S) whenever S[6, and
for any two consecutive coalitions S , S [6 the players in S \S arem m11 m11 m
symmetric.
To this end, we introduce some notation. For any S#N, we denote the largest
]
coalition in 6 that is a subset of S by S, and we define M[maxhv(S)2 v(T )uS, T #Nj.
Now, define the game v* by
] ]v*(S)5 v(S)1M(uSu2 uSu).
It is trivial that we have indeed v*# v, and that the players in S \S are symmetricm11 m
for every pair of consecutive coalitions S , S [6. It remains to show that v* ism11 m
convex.
Lemma 12. The game v* is convex.
Proof. Take two coalitions S and T. We have to show that
v*(S)1 v*(T )# v*(S> T )1 v*(S< T ).
]] ] ] ]] ] ]Note that S> T5S>T. The inclusion S> T $S>T follows directly from the facts that
] ] ]] ] ]S>T is a member of 6 and also a subset of S> T. The inclusion S>T #S>T follows
]] ] ]directly from the fact that S>T is a subset of both S and T.
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]] ] ] ] ]Also note that S< T $S<T, which follows from that fact both S and T are subsets of
]]S<T. Equality need not hold here.
]] ] ] ]] ] ]To prove the lemma we distinguish the cases S<T .S<T and S<T5S<T.
]] ] ]A. S<T5S<T. Then
] ] ] ]v*(S)1 v*(T ) 5 v(S)1 v(T )1M(uSu2 uSu1 uT u2 uT u)
] ] ] ]
# v(S>T )1 v(S<T )
] ] ] ]
5 1M(uS>T u2 uS>T u1 uS<T u2 uS< T u)
]] ]]
5 v(S>T )1 v(S< T )
]] ]]
5 1M(uS> T u2 uS> T u1 uS< T u2 uS<T u)
5 v*(S>T )1 v*(S< T ).
]] ] ]B. S<T .S<T. In this case the inequality
] ] ]] ]]uSu2 uSu1 uT u2 uT u# uS> T u2 uS> T u1 uS<T u2 uS< T u
is strict, and by the choice of M it follows that
] ] ]] ] ] ]] ]]M(uSu2 uSu1 uT u2 uT u)1 v(S< T )2 v(S<T )#M(uS> T u2 uS> T u1 uS<T u
2 uS<T u).
This yields v*(S)1 v*(T )# v*(S> T )1 v*(S< T ) h.
Lemma 13. Let v be a strictly convex game. Then f(v)5f(v*).
Proof. Define, for 0#l# 1, the game v(l) by
v(l)[(12l)v1lv*.
Since f satisfies CON, the maximal number l* for which f(v) is equal to f(v(l))
whenever l is less or equal to l* exists.
It suffices to show that l* equals 1. So, assume that l*, 1. Then for ´ . 0 (and
´ , 12l*) we can define the game w(´) by
w(´)(S)[maxhv(l*)(S), v(l*1´)(S)j.
A. We will show that f(v(l*)) is an element of C(w(´)). To this end, notice that
f(v) is an element of the core of both v and v*. Then it is easy to check that f(v) is an
element of the core of both v(l*) and v(l*1´). Hence, f(v(l*))5f(v) must also be
an element of w(´).
B. We will show that f(v(l*1´)) is also an element of C(w(´)) for sufficiently
small ´. To this end note that f(v(l*1´)) is an element of C(v(l*1´)) by definition.
So we only need to show that f(v(l*1´)) is an element of C(v(l*)) for sufficiently
small ´. So, take a coalition S. To show:
f(v(l*1´))(S)$ v(l*)(S).
First, suppose that S is tight on f(v(l*)) in the game v(l*). Now, since f(v(l*))5
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f(v) is an element of both C(v) and C(v*), and since S , . . . , S are the only tight1 k
coalitions on f(v) in C(v), it is clear that S is an element of 6, say S5 S . Thenl
f(v(l*1´))(S ) $ v(l*1´)(S )l l
5 ((12l*2´)v(S )1 (l*1´)v*(S )l l
5 ((12l*2´)v*(S )1 (l*1´)v*(S )5 v*(S ).l l l
Secondly, if is S is not tight on f(v(l*)) in the game v(l*). Then
f(v(l*))(S). v(l*)(S)
and since f satisfies CON, it is clear that
f(v(l*1´))(S). v(l*)(S)
must still hold for sufficiently small ´. These two arguments together show that
f(v(l*1´)) is indeed an element of the core of v(l*), and hence of the core of w(´),
for sufficiently small ´.
C. Now recall that v is strictly convex. So, by the assumption that l*, 1 this is also
true for v(l*) and v(l*1´) for sufficiently small ´. Then it is easy to see that w(´) is
convex for sufficiently small ´. In particular, w(´) is an element of the domain of f.
Further, notice that the core of w(´) is a subset of both the core of v(l*) and the core
of v(l*1´). So, since we already saw in A and B that f(v(l*)) and f(v(l*1´)) are
both elements of the core of w(´) for sufficiently small ´, by IIC we get that
f(v)5f(v(l*))5f(w(´))5f(v(l*1´))
for sufficiently small ´. This contradicts the definition of l*. Hence, l*5 1 and
f(v)5f(v*). h
Now we have gathered enough equipment to proceed with the goal of this Appendix.
We will give a proof of
Theorem 1. Let v be a convex game. Then f(v) is a partial marginal of v.
Proof. The proof is split up in two consecutive cases.
A. First, let v be a strictly convex game. Let 6 be the chain 55 S , ? ? ? , S 5N1 k
of all tight coalitions on f(v). We will show that f(v) equals the partial marginal p(6,
v).
To this end, let j be a fixed player, and let m be the unique index such that j is a
member of the coalition X [S \S . Construct the game v* as described at the startm11 m11 m
of this section. By Lemma 13 it suffices to show that
v(S )2 v(S )m11 m
]]]]]f(v*) 5 .j uS \S um11 m
Recall that v(S )5 v*(S ) for all coalitions in the chain 6. So, by Lemma 13 we getl l
f(v*)(S )5f(v)(S )5 v(S )5 v*(S )l l l l
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for every coalition S in the chain. In particular we getl
f(v*)(S \S ) 5f(v*)(S )2f(v*)(S )m11 m m11 m
5 v*(S )2 v*(S )5 v(S )2 v(S ).m11 m m11 m
Finally, notice that all players in S \S are symmetric in v*. Hence, by SYM andm11 m
the previous equality we get the above formula.
kB. Now let v be an arbitrary convex game. Then we can take a sequence (v )k[N
k
strictly convex convex games that converges to v. We have just shown that each f(v ) is
a partial marginal. Then, using the fact that f satisfies CON, it is easy to see that f(v)
must also be a partial marginal. h
A ppendix B. Proof for Section 3
TLemma 14. The game v is a large core game.
TProof. Suppose that v is not a large core game. Then there is an allocation x such that
T
x(S)$ v (S) for all coalitions S,N and, moreover, there is no core allocation y in
TC(v ) with y# x. Now notice that we can choose this allocation x even such that for
T 3
every player i there is a coalition S with i[ S and x(S )5 v (S ) . We will derive ai i i i
contradiction in four steps.
A. First we will show for every coalition S that either S is a subset of T or S has ani i i
empty intersection with T. Suppose that this is not so. Then there is a coalition S fori
which S >T and S \T are both not empty. Then we can calculate thati i
T
2KuS u5 v (S )5 x(S ) 5 x(S > T )1 x(S \T )i i i i i
T
$ v (S > T )1 x(S \T )i i
5 v(S > T )1 x(S \T )i i
. 2KuS > T u1 x(S \T )i i
$ 2KuS > T u2KuS \T u5 2KuS u.i i i
Contradiction.
B. Now take a player k in T. We will show that x #m(k). To this end, notice that Sk k
must be a subset of T by A, since k is a member of both S and T. So,k
Tv(S )5 v (S )5 x(S ) 5 x 1 x(S \k)k k k k k
T
$ x 1 v (S \k)k k
5 x 1 v(S \k).k k
3If x does not yet satisfy this condition, we can construct in n iterations an allocation that does by lowering in
k21 k21
step k the payoff to player k in the current allocation x by the non-negative amount minhx (S)2
T n Tv (S)uS] kj. The final allocation x of this procedure is not an element of the core of v by the way the initial
allocation x is chosen.
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Hence, x # v(S )2 v(S \k)#m(k).k k k
C. Now let k be a player not in T. We will show that x 5 2K. To this end, noticek
that x $ 2K for every player j since x is a core element. Further, since k[ S impliesj k
that S is not a subset of T, we know thatk
T
x(S )5 v (S )5 2KuS uk k k
Tby the definition of v . These two observations together imply that x 5 2K for everyj
player in j in S . In particular, x 5 2K.k k
D. Finally, using B and C, we get
T
x(N)5 x(T )1 x(N\T )#O m(k)2KuN\T u, v (N)
k[T
where the strict inequality follows from the choice of K. However, the inequality
T
x(N), v (N) contradicts the choice of x. h
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